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Courts will not enforce liquidated damage clauses when a stipulated sum 
exceeds (i) the harm that the promisee could reasonably expect to suffer from 
breach or (ii) the actual harm that breach turned out to cause.' Courts tradition- 
ally have not awarded punitive damages "for a breach of contract unless the 
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are 
recoverable."2 Courts also will not grant specific performance "if damages 
would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party," nor 
will courts enforce contracts that accord promisees a right to specific relief.3 
These three rules share the goal of limiting a promisee's recovery to his lost 
expectation. The liquidated damage rule prevents the promisee from contracting 
for a supracompensatory remedy, and the punitive damage rule prevents courts 
from awarding such a remedy. The specific performance rule achieves the law's 
goal indirectly. A promisee who has a right to specific performance can compel 
the promisor to perform even when the promisor's loss from performance 
would exceed the promisee's gain. A promisor can purchase her freedom, but 
sophisticated promisees sometimes will demand more than their expectation as 
the price. Permitting specific performance only when damages could not protect 
the expectation interest limits the ability of promisees to obtain supracom- 
pensatory payments by threatening to seek specific relief. The ban on "specific 
performance clauses" prevents a promisee from obtaining by contract he power 
that the general specific performance rule aims to abolish. 
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These three rules rest on a normative premise and on a positive premise. 
The normative premise holds that supracompensatory remedies are undesirable. 
The positive premise holds that promisees prefer supracompensatory remedies, 
and so must be prevented from getting them. The normative premise is true but 
the positive premise is false. It is shown below that promisees do not want 
contractual damage measures that would grant more than their lost expectation. 
Several legal implications follow from this showing. 
First, the initial, or "ex ante," branch of the liquidated damage rule is 
unnecessary. Courts do not have to prevent promisees from obtaining penalty 
clauses if promisees do not want penalty clauses. The ex ante rule is not merely 
unnecessary: judicial review produces mischief. Courts sometimes mistake 
compensatory damage measures for penalties, and so have found that particular 
liquidated damage clauses would inevitably overcompensate promisees when 
those clauses only protected the expectation. Thus, the ex ante branch of the 
liquidated damage rule should be abandoned. 
The "ex post" branch of the liquidated damage rule, which bans clauses that 
overcompensate in fact, seems justifiable at first glance. An ex ante reasonable 
estimate of the damages that the promisee will later incur may exceed the 
promise's actual loss. The normative premise that supracompensatory emedies 
are undesirable then apparently justifies the ex post branch of the rule, because 
it implies that courts should not enforce liquidated damage clauses that exceed 
actual damages. This view is unpersuasive: party estimates may err, but courts 
generally do not review contracts to ensure that performance under a contract's 
terms yields the consequences that the parties expected it to have. The general 
absence of judicial review follows from two premises: even with the benefit 
of hindsight, courts seldom could do better for the parties than the parties can 
do for themselves; and the willingness of courts to attempt to rescue parties 
from bad deals reduces the parties' incentive to write good contracts originally. 
These premises support foregoing judicial review of the liquidated damage term 
just as they support foregoing review of other contract terms. Thus the ex post 
branch of the liquidated damage rule should be repealed as well. 
Some courts have relaxed the traditional prohibition against awarding 
punitive damages in ordinary contract actions. The traditional rule should be 
restored. A state-supplied right to sue for punitive damages is similar to a 
contract-supplied right to sue for a penalty; in both cases, a disappointed 
promisee would sue on the right if it existed. Showing that promisees prefer 
the right not to exist implies both that a promisee would reject a contract that 
contained a penalty clause and would vote against a punitive damages regime 
if he could. This promisee preference should control.4 
4. Punitive damage awards are sometimes justified on retributive and deterrence grounds. Retributive 
concerns are outside this Article's scope; they also seem irrelevant to the commercial breaches that are its 
subject. Punitive damages will increase deterrence when the law is underenforced. For example, if some 
tort victims will not sue, injurers face a suboptimal incentive to behave properly. Letting plaintiff victims 
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Finally, parties should be permitted to contract for specific relief. The 
current ban on such contracts can be justified on grounds similar to those that 
underlie the liquidated damage rule. The ex ante aspect of this justification 
holds that a right to specific performance functions similarly to a right to sue 
on a penalty clause: both rights permit promisees to compel inefficient perfor- 
mances. If promisees want this power, then they should be prevented from 
contracting for specific relief, just as they are prevented from contracting for 
penalties. But promisees do not want this power. Rather, promisees prefer 
specific performance primarily when their expectation cannot be monetized; in 
this circumstance, a promisee neither could prove damages nor create a liquidat- 
ed damage clause. Because specific relief is efficient relative to no relief, courts 
should enforce specific performance contracts. If courts were to do this, then 
arguably they should police these contracts specially, just as they police liqui- 
dated damage clauses specially. Again, the ex post justification for judicial 
review holds that the parties' initial belief that specific performance was 
necessary may turn out to be mistaken, but the promisee might then use his 
contract right to specific relief to extort a supracompensatory payment from the 
promisor. As is shown below, promisees do not use the specific performance 
remedy to exploit today, and would be unlikely to use the remedy for exploita- 
tion were they able to contract freely for it. Hence, courts should not police 
specific performance contracts specially.' If specific relief clauses become 
enforceable, the current specific performance rule would not be the best default 
(what would be is a difficult question). 
Part I shows that promisees prefer compensatory remedies. Part II explores 
the normative implications of this preference. Part III defends the use of certain 
assumptions that underlie the argument. Part IV considers one important and 
sometimes unrealistic assumption in detail. This assumption holds that 
promisees always sue to protect their expectation interest; in particular, 
promisees always detect breaches and never are deterred from suing by high 
legal costs. The former aspect of the assumption often is plausible because 
breach usually is easy to detect; the latter aspect is more questionable because 
legal costs do seem to deter some suits. Part IV makes two claims. First, 
promisees prefer not to solve the "collection cost problem" with penalty 
clauses. Second, the state should not respond to the inefficiencies that some- 
times follow from underenforcement of the law with punitive damage awards. 
Rather, the state should encourage promisees to sue by reducing collection 
costs. Part V considers the recent trend to award punitive damages for contract 
recover punitive damages responds to this underenforcement concern. Part IV below considers whether 
underenforcement justifies punitive damages in contract contexts. The claim made in the text above is that 
punitive damages should not be awarded to vindicate the promisee's interest in realizing gains from trade. 
5. Courts do and should police all contracts to ensure that parties do not violate the duty of good faith 
in performance. An early and perceptive argument hat the parties should be allowed to contract for specific 
performance is in Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978). 
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breaches which disadvantage individuals. This trend is particularly manifest in 
two contexts, the wrongful denial of insurance benefits to individual insured6 
and dismissals from employment.7 Awarding punitive damages in the former 
case is undesirable; awarding them in the latter case may be wise only when 
an unregulated right to dismiss would create an externality, such as reducing 
a firm's incentive to obey the law. 
I. CONTRACTING FOR REMEDIES 
Part I shows that promisees would reject supracompensatory remedies in 
three contexts that cover much of the contracting ground: (i) when parties 
function in competitive markets; (ii) when parties bargain (in competitive 
markets, there is no bargaining) and are well informed about the relevant 
economic parameters; (iii) when parties bargain but are imperfectly informed. 
In the first two cases, the promisee's preference for compensatory relief follows 
from the familiar result that the expectation interest remedy is efficient respect- 
ing the breach decision. The expectation remedy is efficient respecting breach 
because it induces the parties to perform when performance would maximize 
their joint gains, and to breach otherwise.8 In cases (i) and (ii), the promise's 
preference for expectation damages follows from the remedy's efficiency 
because the promisee's share of the gains from trade is exogenously deter- 
mined; hence, the promise cannot maneuver to obtain a larger share of a 
smaller pie. The promisee thus wants the pie to be as large as possible. Since 
a penalty clause would shrink the pie-that is, reduce the parties' joint gains 
from contracting-the promisee would reject it. 
In the third case, strategic behavior is possible. A standard result in bargain- 
ing theory is that uninformed parties sometimes rationally sacrifice efficiency 
gains in the course of attempting to maximize their own shares. Thus, it is a 
separate question whether promisees would seek inefficient damage measures 
6. Courts that award punitive damages for the breach of an insurance contract usually describe the 
breach as a tort-the violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Egan v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141 (1979); Anderson v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). These are best regarded as contract actions 
because the companies' conduct was a breach of contract and because similarly situated parties could 
respond in their contracts to the legal rule. Some courts do let promisees sue in contract itself. See, e.g., 
Linscott v. Rainier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 (1980); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 
Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970). 
7. These courts also say that the action is in tort. See Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 
fll. 1983); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); K Mart Corp. 
v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987). 
8. That the expectation measure is efficient respecting breach was first proved formally by Shavell. 
See Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 1 1 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980). Sam Rea inferred 
from this result that "the parties to a contract are unlikely to agree ex ante to damages that exceed the 
expected loss." Rea, Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 
159 (1984). This Article confirms and extends Rea's inference by showing that promisees would not seek 
penalty clauses in a variety of contracting contexts. The Article also draws different normative implications 
than Rea does from the promisee's preference. See inf-a notes 24-32 and accompanying text. 
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when bargaining under conditions of imperfect information. Part I.C. shows that 
promisees never would seek penalty clauses in this context but may seek 
damage measures that inefficiently undercompensate. The normative implica- 
tions of this latter preference are not pursued here. 
A. The Competitive Case 
The conclusion that a promisee functioning in a competitive market would 
not purchase a contractual remedy in excess of his best estimate of the harm 
that breach would impose rests on the following assumptions: (1) the promisee 
is not risk preferring; (2) the promisor and promisee share the same estimate 
of the breach probability; (3) the promisor's costs are determined exogenously9 
(this assumption implies that the promisee cannot affect the probability of 
performance except through his choice of a contract damage measure); (4) the 
promisee does not engage in post-contractual reliance;10 (5) the promisee 
always detects breach11 and will sue if breach occurs; (6) renegotiation after 
the contract is made is costly;12 (7) if the promisor breaches, a court cannot 
accurately determine what the promisee's gain from performance would have 
been." 
It is helpful to begin by recreating the result that a contract requiring the 
promisor to pay the expectation interest remedy on breach would maximize the 
9. In the analysis below, the promisor estimates performance cost when the contract is made; her actual 
costs are determined by the state of the world ex post. The promisor's costs will be higher than her estimate 
if input prices unexpectedly rise. The promisor is assumed to have no control over input prices. Breach in 
all the cases considered here is preferable to the promisor when her costs come to exceed the price by a 
sufficient amount. 
10. This assumption is made for convenience and does not affect the analysis. If the contract specifies 
a particular sum as the promisee's damages-the situation considered here-then the promisee's legal 
expectation would not be a function of his postcontract reliance expenditures. Consequently, the promisee 
will engage in optimal reliance. The question is whether the sum that the contract specifies will be penal 
or not. This is taken up next. The effect of the legal damage rules on the parties' reliance incentives is 
thoughtfully reviewed by Craswell and Rogerson. See Craswell, Performance, Reliance and One-Sided 
Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989); Rogerson, EfficientReliance and Damage Measuresfor Breach 
of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39 (1984). 
11. The assumption that breach always is detected is plausible in the cases considered here, in which 
breach entails the failure to supply promised goods or services, or to pay money when it is due, or to retain 
someone in employment. Undetected breaches seem primarily to occur in certain principal-agent contexts, 
as where an employee covertly shirks. An optimal principal-agent contract could have a penal element when 
one possible output correlates perfectly with the shirking input. Such "shifting support schemes" are not 
discussed here. See E. RASMUSEN, GAMEs AND INFORMATION: A  INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 148-50 
(1989). Undetected breaches are briefly considered infra at note 67. 
12. If renegotiation is costly, the parties have an incentive to write an efficient initial contract. Since 
an efficient damage measure exists-the expectation interest-renegotiation will not be discussed. 
13. Goetz and Scott were the first to show that promisees seek liquidated damage clauses when the 
expectation interest would be difficult to prove. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and 
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). The seven assumptions listed above apply to all the cases considered here 
unless it is otherwise stated. 
374 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 369 
parties' joint gains from contracting.'4 If the contract is performed, the promi- 
sor, who is assumed to be a seller, would earn the price less her costs; the 
promisee would earn the value he places on performance less the price. The 
sum of these gains is the surplus from contracting. To calculate this surplus, 
a little notation is helpful. Let p be the product's price, c be the promisor's cost 
of producing or purchasing the product and v be the promisee's gross gain from 
performance. Then the contracting surplus is p - c (promisor gain) + v - p 
(promisee gain) = v - c (promisee gain less promisor cost). When the gain from 
performance would exceed the cost, the parties should perform; when the gain 
would be below the cost, the parties should not perform. In this latter case, 
breach would generate a positive gain; the promisor would save her cost c, 
which exceeds the promisee's lost value v. Hence, the applicable damage rule 
should induce performance when v > c but not otherwise. 
The expectation interest remedy awards the promisee his expected gross 
gain less the price (v - p). Any damage rule bites only when the promisor's 
costs exceed the price (otherwise the promisor will perform). Under the expec- 
tation remedy, the promisor will perform when her loss from doing so (c - p) 
is less than her loss from paying damages (v - p), or when v > c; the promisor 
will breach when her performance cost would exceed the damage payment, or 
when v < c. The expectation measure thus induces performance when perfor- 
mance would generate positive gains, and breach otherwise. 
Next define a contract damage measure as a term that requires the promisor 
to pay k times the expectation interest to the promisee upon breach, where 
0 < k < 0. If k = 1, the damage measure would award the promisee his expec- 
tation; if k > 1, the damage measure would award a penal sum (k is then 
referred to as the "penal multiplier"). When the contract contains a damage 
measure, the promisor will perform when her cost of performance is less than 
k times the expectation remedy. If k exceeds one, the promisor thus may be 
induced to perform although performance cost would exceed the value of 
performance to the promisee. Similarly, if k is less than one, the promisor may 
breach too often. Thus, only the expectation measure maximizes the parties' 
joint gains from contracting. 
Promisees functioning in competitive markets would not purchase 
supracompensatory remedies (contract damage measures with k exceeding one). 
A competitive market is defined by the "free entry" condition. There is free 
entry if a new firm could enter a market at no cost disadvantage relative to 
incumbent firms. When free entry obtains, price in equilibrium equals average 
cost (including a competitive return on the sellers' investment). If firms in the 
market were earning profits, new firms would enter until the profits were 
14. When the parties' comparative advantages at reducing or insuring against breach are considered, 
some parties functioning in competitive markets will prefer damage rules that award less than the expectation 
interest. This idea is interestingly discussed by Epstein. See Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential 
Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD 105 (1989). 
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competed away. That firms earn zero profits implies that buyers-the 
promisees-receive the entire surplus from contracting. Consequently, the 
promisees want the surplus to be as large as possible. The expectation interest 
measure maximizes the contracting surplus. Thus, promisees would contract 
for a damage measure that just equals their expectation. 
It may be helpful to say a little more concerning why a promisee would 
prefer the expectation measure to a chance at a large penalty if the promisor 
breaches. Let pc be the price associated with a compensatory damage measure 
dc, where dC = - pc, and let pP be the price associated with a penal damage 
measure dP = k(v - Vp), where k > 1. As said above, the promisor wants to 
perform when price exceeds cost. Hence, a contractually induced performance 
always is at a loss to the promisor. The greater are the damages that the 
promisor must pay on breach, the more often will the promisor choose to 
perform (at a loss) rather than pay. Thus, the cost of the contract to the promi- 
sor is increasing in the damage measure. Since price equals cost in the competi- 
tive case, the price associated with the damage rule dP exceeds the price 
associated with the damage rule dc; that is, pP > pc. 
Next ask whether the promisee would prefer a penalty clause. There are two 
cases to consider. In the first, the promisor performs. The promisee's net gain 
under the compensatory damage measure dc is his gross gain minus the price 
(v - pc) while his net gain under the penal measure dP would be the same gross 
gain minus the "penal price" (v - pP). Since the penal price pP exceeds the 
compensatory price pC, the promisee's net gain would be lower under dP. The 
promisee always does worse under the penal measure when the promisor 
performs because the contract price is increasing in k, the penal multiplier, 
while the promisee's gross gain from performance, v, is fixed. In the second 
case, the promisor breaches. The promisee then does better with a penalty 
clause because his recovery is greater. The loss to the promisee in the former 
case necessarily exceeds his gain in the latter. Recall that the parties'-here the 
promisee's-surplus is maximized under the expectation damage measure. This 
implies that the surplus must be smaller under any other damage measure; and 
the surplus could be smaller with the penal measure only if the promisee's loss 
from promisor performance would exceed his gain from promisor breach. 
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This conclusion is illustrated with a simple picture that plots the promise's 





K = I 
In Figure 1, the promisee's expected gain, which is plotted on the vertical axis, 
is maximized at k = 1 (damages are compensatory) and becomes constant at 
the value for k that is high enough always to induce the promisor to perform. 
Hence, in the competitive case a promisee would not knowingly contract for 
damage measures that would overcompensate him relative to the expectation 
measure. 
B. The Perfect Information Bargaining Case 
When there is heterogeneity in the market for goods or services, a promisor- 
seller has bargaining power; she is supplying something that is (at least slightly) 
unique. The promisee also has bargaining power because the demand for unique 
items is relatively limited. The bargaining problem has been extensively studied 
for cases when each bargainer knows the other's payoffs from agreement and 
disagreement. This study shows that the parties divide the gains from trade 
according to their respective discount rates and disagreement payoffs. Respect- 
ing the former factor, suppose that the promisor's discount rate exceeds the 
promisee's discount rate. Then the failure to agree promptly imposes higher 
opportunity costs on the promisor than on the promisee; the promisor's higher 
discount rate implies that she attaches relatively less weight to future gains than 
to present gains. Consequently, the promisor is less willing than the promisee 
to reject a low offer now in the hope of getting a higher one later. The more 
patient player-the party with the lower discount rate-thus has more bargain- 
ing power; he can afford to wait longer to get his price. 
Respecting the disagreement factor, suppose that there is an exogenous 
probability that the parties' bargaining process will cease-a selling season will 
15. Figure I is a copy of a computer graph of the promisee's expected gain as a function of the penal 
multiplier k. The graph was obtained by solving the promisee's maximization problem mathematically and 
putting sample values of the variables into the solution. The math is not set out here because the intuition 
seems clear enough. The graph identifies the "global max"; the promisee's gain declines below the gain 
under compensatory damages when the multiplier drops below one because then the promisor breaches too 
frequently. 
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end, for example. Were bargaining, to terminate, each party would receive its 
"disagreement payoff," the value of the party's next best option. These dis- 
agreement payoffs often differ. Then the party with the higher disagreement 
payoff has more bargaining power. Because she is relatively less prejudiced by 
the failure to agree, she can hold out for a better deal in the relationship."6 
Now consider the promisee's preferences respecting the contract's damage 
measure. The promisee's share of the gains from trade is exogenously deter- 
mined; it is a function of the parties' discount rates and disagreement pay- 
offs-their respective bargaining power. A promisee who cannot affect the size 
of his share will want to maximize the size of the pie. This he can partly do 
because the gains from trade are a function, inter alia, of the contract's damage 
measure, which the parties choose. As shown above, the damage measure 
influences the gains through its effect on the promisor's decision whether to 
perform. Consequently, the promisee would bargain for the expectation mea- 
sure. Only it maximizes the contracting surplus-the pie's size. Experimental 
evidence is consistent with the conclusion that promisees would seek the 
expectation measure. This evidence shows that parties bargain to the efficient 
outcome when they know what that outcome is."7 
C. The Imperfect Information Bargaining Case 
Parties that bargain often do not know their adversaries' payoffs or other 
relevant information about them. This leads parties to engage in strategic 
behavior."8 For example, a buyer will attempt to persuade the seller that the 
buyer has a low valuation for the object of sale because a seller who believes 
this will accept a lower price. When bargaining itself is costless to the parties 
but they have positive discount rates, strategic behavior will delay agreement 
unduly; when continuing to bargain is costly, the parties sometimes may not 
agree although positive gains from trade exist."9 It is shown here that another 
inefficiency would not arise: promisees in imperfect information bargaining 
environments would reject supracompensatory remedies. 
16. This intuitive story respecting the sources of bargaining power is formalized by Sutton. See Sutton, 
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 709 (1986). 
17. See Harrison & Mckee, Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. & ECON. 653 
(1985); Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Effects of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986). 
18. For a recent, illuminating discussion of strategic bargaining, see Johnston, Strategic Bargaining 
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1990). 
19. By now, there is a large literature respecting bargaining. For recent discussions, see Cramton, 
Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 37 MGMT. So. (forthcoming 1991); J. Keenan & F. Wilson, 
Bargaining with Private Information (forthcoming 1991). 
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1. An Intuitive Story 
A seller/promisor wants to trade an object to a buyer/promisee. There is a 
distribution of buyer "types," which means that potential buyers differ in the 
valuation they attach to the object. A buyer's type is just his valuation. The 
seller knows the distribution of buyer types but does not know the type-the 
particular valuation-of the person with whom she is bargaining. The seller will 
offer a contract with two terms, a price and a liquidated damage clause. The 
clause specifies a gross buyer valuation-v in the analysis above-for the 
object. If the seller breaches, she must pay the specified sum to the buyer as 
damages. The seller prefers to sell to the buyer with the highest valuation 
because this buyer is willing to pay the highest price. Accordingly, the seller 
will initially propose a contract with a liquidated damage clause that specifies 
the highest buyer valuation (recall that the seller knows the distribution of buyer 
valuations) and a correspondingly high price. The price is increasing in the 
damage measure; that is, a contract with a high liquidated damage clause has 
a higher price than a contract with a low liquidated damage clause (because, 
as Part I.A. showed, higher damage measures impose higher costs on sellers, 
and a seller will not propose a price that is below cost). 
The buyer can accept the initial high price, high damage measure contract 
or reject it (buyers have positive discount rates and so are motivated to agree 
rather than reject because rejection delays and thus partly dissipates the gains 
from trade). If the buyer does reject, the seller will propose a new contract with 
a lower price and a liquidated damage clause that corresponds to the second 
highest buyer valuation. This process continues until the buyer finally accepts 
a contract. Because the seller does not know the buyer's actual type, a buyer 
can accept a contract with a liquidated damage clause that is above his true 
valuation for the object of sale, equal to his true valuation or below his true 
valuation. The damage measure is penal if it is above the buyer's true valuation; 
then the buyer will be overcompensated in the event of breach. The question 
is what kind of contract the buyer will accept. 
A buyer will not accept a contract with a damage measure that is above his 
true valuation, but may accept a contract with a damage measure that is below 
it. Respecting the former conclusion, a buyer cannot fool the seller to the 
buyer's advantage by accepting a contract with a damage measure that exceeds 
his true valuation. The buyer is disadvantaged by this strategy when the seller 
performs, because the buyer pays the price of a person with a higher valuation 
than his own. The buyer is overcompensated in the event of breach-he 
receives damages that exceed his true valuation-but he has paid the (appropri- 
ately high) price for this opportunity. Thus, the buyer gains nothing by misrep- 
resenting his type-by accepting a contract with a penal damage measure. 
In contrast, a buyer may fool the seller to his advantage by pretending to 
have a lower valuation than he actually has. Such a buyer gains when the seller 
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performs, because he pays the price of a person with a lower valuation than 
his own; the buyer loses when the seller breaches, because he then is 
undercompensated. The gain will exceed the loss when the seller has consider- 
able bargaining power. To see why, realize that the buyer can make positive 
profits in two ways: (i) by realizing the difference between his true valuation 
and the appropriate price or (ii) by fooling the seller into charging a price that 
is below the price that the buyer's true valuation would warrant. When the 
seller has considerable bargaining power, she is able to appropriate much of 
the gain from trade by charging a price that is close to the buyer's "revealed 
valuation"-the valuation that the contract's damage measure specifies. In this 
event, the buyer's strategy of earning profits by realizing the difference between 
his true valuation and the price is relatively unattractive; that difference is 
small. The high valuing buyer does better by "revealing" a falsely low valua- 
tion and paying the correspondingly low price. Hence, buyers sometimes may 
accept contracts with undercompensatory liquidated damage clauses. 
In sum, when the parties are uninformed bargainers, promisees still will not 
accept contracts with penal damage measures, but may agree to contracts with 
undercompensatory damage measures. The analysis that generates this conclu- 
sion is somewhat artificial; in it, the seller does all the proposing while in real 
life the parties often make proposals to each other. The logic that generates the 
conclusion seems general, however. It is difficult to see how a promisee in an 
imperfect information environment could maximize utility by pretending to a 
valuation for the object of sale that is higher than his own. Finally, a contract 
with an undercompensatory damage measure is inefficient because the seller 
will breach too often. This inefficiency is another cost that imperfect informa- 
tion imposes.' 
2. An Analytical Story 
20. The analysis above assumes that both parties know the breach probability. When promisees/buyers 
do not know it, there is a dispute in the literature as to whether reliable promisors would offer penal damage 
measures to signal that they are unlikely to breach. Less reliable promisors could(not mimic these signals 
because they would have to pay off too frequently. For arguments that promisors would offer penalties in 
some asymmetric information environments, see R. COOTER &T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 295 (1988); 
Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 
720-21 (1986). For an argument against, see Rea, supra note 8. This dispute is irrelevant here. The liquidated 
damage rule attempts to protect promisors from promisees. If a sophisticated promisor wants to send a 
penalty signal, only paternalistic considerations would justify a court in preventing her from doing so. 
21. This section puts the analysis above in formal terms. Persons familiar with bargaining theory will 
recognize that the text sets out a screening model, in which the uninformed party-the seller-"screens" 
buyer types by proposing contracts. The novelty here is that the screening is done by proposing contract 
clauses-the contract's damage measure-along with prices. Readers who find the intuitive story clear 
enough and who are uninterested in the details can skip to the summary section and Part II. An interesting 
screening model that uses contract terms but is set in a market rather than a bargaining context is Matthews 
& Moore, Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional 
Screening, 55 ECONOMETRICA 441 (1987). 
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Two parties want to trade an object. The seller does not know the valuation 
of the buyer with whom she deals but knows the distribution of buyer types. 
For simplicity, this distribution is assumed to have two members: v e {Ivl,vh, 
where 0 < v < Vh. The buyer knows the distribution of seller costs but ex post 
will not know the seller's cost realization. The seller can propose a contract that 
is the pair {p,d), where p is the price and d is the damage measure. There are 
two damage measures (reflecting the two valuations): dh = vh and d, = v,. There 
also is a high and a low price: Ph > p,. Four contracts are possible but two 
would not exist in equilibrium. The seller will not propose the contract {pl,dh} 
because if the buyer actually has a high valuation, the seller believes that she 
can do better than the low price p,; thus the seller would not begin with the 
contract {pl,dh). The buyer will not accept the contract {ph,d,) because he would 
lose money; knowing this, the seller will not propose that contract. Hence, 
attention can be restricted to the contracts {pl,dl} and {ph,dh}. To keep the 
problem interesting, assume that the seller earns greater profits under the 
contract {p,,d,} than under the seller's next best alternative. 
There are two relevant questions. First, would penalty contracts exist in 
equilibrium? In this story, a penalty contract is the pair Iph,dh} when accepted 
by the low valuing buyer. Second, would undercompensatory damage measures 
exist in equilibrium? The contract { p,,d, I is undercompensatory when accepted 
by the high valuing buyer. The seller begins by proposing the contract {ph,dh}; 
under it, she earns the maximum profit in performance states because she is 
paid the highest price, and she is appropriately compensated for risking the high 
penalty. If this contract is rejected, she proposes the contract { pl,dl}. The two 
questions can be approached by determining when (if ever) a buyer would do 
better by pretending to be a type different than his own. 
To pursue this issue, the contract prices must first be determined. The 
seller's price is the sum of three elements: (i) the expected cost of performance 
when she does perform; (ii) the expected cost of the damage payment when 
she breaches; and (iii) the share of the expected surplus from contracting that 
the seller's bargaining power permits her to command. The bargaining power 
parameter is x where 0 < x < 1. When x = 1, the seller gets all the gains from 
trade. For convenience, the seller's costs are assumed to be uniformly distribut- 
ed on the unit interval.22 First consider the contract {ph,dhl. The seller takes 
the damage measure to equal the buyer's valuation. Then the price is: 
1) Ph=f cdc+(l-Vh)vh+xf (vhc)dc 
22. This means that all seller cost realizations are equally probable and that these (and the buyer's 
valuations) are normalized to lie between zero and one. The argument below holds for the normal distribu- 
tion and any other standard distribution. The uniform distribution is the easiest to work with. 
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The solutions to this and for the similarly derived price p, are 
2 2 
2) Ph V Vh +X( V 2 2 
2 2 
3) VI, VI 
2 2 
The first question is whether a buyer with a low valuation will accept the 
contract {ph,dh}. His expected gain from doing this is 
4) E(Bh ) =vh(v,-ph) +( lVh)(VhaPh) 
His expected gain from rejecting the contract {ph,dh} and accepting the appro- 
priate contract {pl,dl) is 
5) E(B)=vl-p 
Therefore, the low valuing buyer will accept the appropriate contract23 when 
6) 1 h E(B,)>E(B,) 
Substituting the values for the prices into the inequality and letting x = 0 (the 
seller has no bargaining power), the inequality simplifies to 
7) (2+V)> 
This is satisfied for all values of v, and Vh. As x increases, the two prices 
increase but the buyer's valuation is unchanged. Consequently, expression (4) 
and expression (5) become smaller in the same proportion. Therefore, the 
inequality in (6) is satisfied for all values of x that exceed zero as well; low 
valuing buyers would not accept the contract {ph,dh}. No buyer, that is, will 
pretend to have a valuation higher than his own. 
There will be a separating equilibrium if the high valuing buyer would 
accept the contract {Phdh} that the low valuing buyer will reject. An example 
shows that a high valuing buyer would reject this contract and accept the 
23. The first three terms in equation (1) are the three elements of the seller's price that are described 
in text. In these equations, the probabilities of performance and breach can be expressed as Vh and (1 - Vh) 
respectively. This is because the seller's possible costs and the buyer's valuations are assumed to lie on the 
unit interval. The seller in this case believes that she is dealing with the high valuing buyer. Hence, the 
probability that the seller will perform is the probability that her costs will equal or be below the sum vh 
(for she must pay the damage measure vh on breach). No probabilities appear in equation (5) because when 
the low valuing buyer chooses the appropriate contract, his gain is the same in every state; he receives his 
valuation less the price either through performance or through receiving expectation damages of v, - pi. 
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contract {pldl} when the seller has enough bargaining power. Using the solu- 
tions above, let Vh = .8, v1 = .5 and x = .4. Then the high valuing buyer has an 
expected gain of .19 under the contract {Ph,dh} and an expected gain of .20 
under the contract {p1,d1}. When the seller has enough bargaining power, the 
equilibrium will be pooling: all buyer types reject the contract {ph,dh} and 
accept the contract {p1,d1 }. 
The intuition underlying these results is as given above: the low valuing 
buyer never can fool the seller to his advantage by pretending to a valuation 
higher than his own while the high valuing buyer can fool the seller in perfor- 
mance states. When the seller has enough bargaining power, the latter buyer 
type does better by fooling the seller than by accepting the contract that is 
appropriate to his type. Thus buyers will reject contracts with penal damage 
measures but sometimes will accept contracts with undercompensatory damage 
measures. The latter contracts are inefficient; when the damage measure is too 
low, the seller breaches too often. Nevertheless, the low "pooling contract" 
{p1,d1} would exist in equilibrium: the seller earns greater profits under the 
pooling contract than she would earn without a deal; and accepting this contract 
is a best response for every buyer type when the seller has sufficient bargaining 
power.24 Contracts sometimes are inefficient in imperfect information environ- 
ments. Under present understanding, contracts will not contain penal damage 
measures. 
D. Summary 
Promisees would not contract for supracompensatory remedies when they 
act in competitive markets or bargain under conditions of full or asymmetric 
information. In the former two cases, promisees cannot engage in strategic 
behavior, but rather earn an exogenously determined share of the gains from 
trade. Hence, promisees prefer the contractual damage measure that maximizes 
these gains. The optimal measure restricts the promisee to his expectation 
24. This result should be viewed as tentative. The analysis does not specify the seller's beliefs 
respecting the probability that the buyer who rejects the contract {ph,dh) has a high or a low valuation, but 
these beliefs may matter. To see why, suppose the seller believes that such a buyer has a high valuation 
with probability .9. Then, when the buyer rejects, the seller's best response may be to offer {ph,dh) again. 
Since the buyer's discount rate is positive, if the seller pursues the strategy of offering {ph,dh) again, the 
high valuing buyer may do better accepting it initially rather than waiting. The low valuing buyer never 
would accept {ph,dh). Hence, particular seller beliefs respecting the probability that each type exists in the 
relevant population together with positive discount rates could cause the pooling equilibrium to disappear. 
This possibility is not pursued formally because it is enough to show here that the low valuing buyer never 
would accept the contract {ph,dh). 
The message space is very restricted in bargaining models, the convention being to permit the parties 
to communicate their types only by their willingness to delay agreement. See, e.g., J. Kennan & R. Wilson, 
Theories of Bargaining Delays (Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation Working Paper No. 12, 1990). 
Whether parties also can communicate with the contract clauses they are willing to propose or accept has 
received relatively little attention. This Article argues that the parties can communicate with the damage 
measure, and such communication would not produce penalties. More sophisticated treatments of the subject 
obviously would be helpful. 
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interest. In the last case, promisees can engage in strategic behavior but never- 
theless do not prefer supracompensatory remedies. This is because a promisee 
would have to pay for this preference, and so would gain nothing by pursuing 
it. The three situations analyzed here cover much of the contracting ground.25 
Thus the law regulating liquidated damage clauses, punitive damages and 
specific performance should be evaluated in light of the recognition that 
promisees prefer compensatory remedies. 
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. Liquidated Damage Clauses 
The ex ante branch of the liquidated damage rule directs a court to put itself 
in the position of the parties when the contract is made, and to ask whether the 
contract's stipulated sum exceeds a reasonable estimate of the loss that the 
promisee could suffer from breach. This judicial review is justified on the 
ground that promisees prefer penalty clauses and so must be prevented from 
obtaining them. The ex post branch of the liquidated damage rule directs a court 
to strike a liquidated damage clause that would overcompensate the promisee. 
This judicial review is justified on the ground that some ex ante reasonable 
estimates of the promisee's harm will turn out to be too high. Part II.A begins 
with the ex ante rule. 
Part I implies that a penal sum would be stipulated only if the contracting 
process was unfair-for example, the promisor was uninformed-or if the 
parties made an erroneous prediction respecting the harm that breach would 
25. This note briefly discusses unincluded cases. A seller may be uninformed about buyer valuations 
but function in a market rather than a bargaining environment. It can be shown that penalty contracts would 
not emerge in such markets; again, a penalty contract would specify a liquidated damage sum that exceeds 
the promisee's valuation. The seller would offer buyers a menu of contracts; different buyer types sometimes 
will choose the pooling contract but no buyer will select a penalty contract. The reason for this preference 
is identical to that set out above. This line of argument was suggested to me by Richard Craswell. A recent 
analysis shows that a monopolist seller may extract a penalty from buyers in order to deter entry by other 
sellers; since the new entrant must compensate a buyer for breaching his contract with the monopolist, entry 
costs are increasing in the size of the contract penalty for breach. Aghion & Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier 
to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987). There is no evidence that such contracts are used. Also, the promi- 
sor/buyer in this analysis is made no worse off by the penalty; he will breach only when a new entrant's 
price is low enough to permit the buyer to pay the monopoly seller the penalty and still be at least as well 
off as if the buyer had purchased under the original contract. Since the liquidated damage rule seeks to 
protect promisors from having to pay large penalties on breach, and in this model it is actually the entrant 
rather than the buyer/promisor who would pay the penalty, the model is not relevant here. Rather, the 
antitrust laws should be used to ban entry deterring contractual practices. Finally, Avery Katz suggests that 
promisees with market power may use penalty clauses to price discriminate; promisors whose demand is 
high may be segregated by their willingness to accept penalty sanctions. The empirical significance of this 
insight is unclear. Also, if the price discrimination is inefficient, again it probably is better dealt with under 
the antitrust laws. There do not seem to be other important situations in which promisees would prefer 
supracompensatory remedies. 
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cause. The unconscionability doctrine applies in the former case.26 The genus 
of which the latter case is a species is generally unregulated: except for the 
liquidated damage clause itself, courts do not ask whether the parties' agree- 
ment rested on predictions that were objectively reasonable given the evidence 
that the parties had before them when they signed the contract. This restraint 
follows from the courts' correct belief that they are not as good at drafting 
contracts as business people are. The liquidated damage rule, however, permits 
enforcement only of damage predictions that are reasonable ex ante and so 
directs courts to evaluate the parties' predictions. Courts should be expected 
to do this job badly. 
There is evidence that this pessimistic expectation is plausible. Consider two 
federal appeals court cases that invalidated widely used liquidated damage 
clauses that did not overcompensate. In Chandler Leasing Division v. Florida- 
Vanderbilt Development Corp.,27 an equipment lease required the lessee to pay 
on default (a) fifteen percent of the equipment's cost to the lessor plus (b) the 
unpaid rent minus (c) the net proceeds of resale of the leased equipment. The 
court held that requiring the lessee to pay fifteen percent of the equipment's 
cost was "an unenforceable attempt to contract for a penalty in excess of actual 
damages." In the court's view, the lessor was entitled only to the unpaid rent 
plus any damage to the leased property and retaking expenses; these damages 
"were certainly capable of accurate estimation." The court added that if the 
lessee breached "in the latter months of the lease," there would be little unpaid 
rent yet the lessee would have to pay the full fifteen percent of the equipment's 
original cost. That would be "unconscionable."28 Since enforcement of the 
fifteen percent clause would necessarily overcompensate the lessor, the clause 
was unreasonable in expectation. 
This decision is incorrect because fifteen percent of the equipment's cost 
almost certainly reflected the expected value of the lessor's reversionary interest 
in the leased property-the probable value the property would have on the 
expiration of the lease. To prohibit the lessor from collecting the value of the 
reversion from the defaulting lessee would produce undercompensation. To see 
why, consider a simple example. A lease requires the promisor to make ten 
monthly payments of $10 each ($100 in total), after which the promisor must 
26. See, e.g., U.C.C. ? 2-302 (1989). As is well known, a contract clause will be found unconscionable 
if it is both procedurally and substantively defective. A supracompensatory damage measure may be 
substantively unconscionable. Part I implies that a promisee might contract for such a measure if the 
contracting process was procedurally unconscionable. For example, a promisor who could not read the 
contract would not exact the full price for a penalty clause; in that event, the clause could produce positive 
profits for the promisee. The unconscionability doctrine is sufficient to deal with such cases. Hence, the 
liquidated damage rule should be analyzed on the assumption that the parties' contracting process was 
procedurally fair. 
27. 464 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1972). This and the next case apparently involved markets rather than 
bargaining environments. 
28. Id. at 270-71. The court did not mean that the contract was unconscionable under the unconsciona- 
bility doctrine, which it made no effort to apply. Rather, the court used the word "unconscionable" to mean 
supracompensatory. 
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return the leased property, which then is expected to be worth $15 (the rever- 
sion). The promisee/lessor's expectation interest thus sums to $115 (rent plus 
reversion). Let the promisor make five payments and breach. The promisee 
resells the property and sues. The lease, suppose, authorizes the promisee to 
recover $50 (the unpaid rent) plus $15 (the reversion or fifteen percent clause), 
less the resale proceeds. Thus, the promisee receives a total sum of $115: $50 
in voluntary payments plus $65 by resale and by action. The $115 sum, recall, 
is the promise's expectation interest so the contract ensures him full compensa- 
tion, not overcompensation. 
The court in Chandler Leasing struck the fifteen percent clause. In the 
illustration here, to do that would permit the promisee to recover only $100, 
the promised rental payments. This undercompensates.29 The fifteen percent 
clause thus was not a penalty but rather a necessary part of the lessor's com- 
pensatory damages. Also, because the type of liquidated damage clause in- 
volved in the case is widely used in equipment leases, the court created a 
precedent that, if followed, would seriously affect the leasing industry.30 
The second example is equally troubling.31 There the promise, A, was to 
process materials that the promisor, B, was to ship to it. The contract required 
B to ship a minimum quantity or to pay A the full processing price for material 
that B did not ship, up to the specified quantity. B shipped less than the mini- 
mum quantity and claimed, in the lawsuit, that the minimum quantity term 
created a penalty. Judge Posner agreed, holding that the clause overcompensated 
the promisee A on an expected basis. Because A would incur no variable 
processing costs for unshipped material, yet would be paid as if it had done the 
work, the contract would permit A to do better on breach than it would do on 
performance (when it would get the full price less its processing cost). 
This analysis was erroneous. The minimum quantity clause was functionally 
equivalent to a take-or-pay clause. These clauses require buyers/promisors to 
pay sellers/promisees the full price on a specified minimum quantity. If the 
promisor breaches by taking less than the stated minimum quantity, the promis- 
29. The court was concerned that the promisor might breach toward the end of the lease and that 
enforcement of the 15% clause would then create a penalty. This is incorrect because the timing of breach 
is irrelevant. In the example in text, suppose that the promisor made $99 in payments and then breached. 
The contract would permit the promisee to recover $16 (unpaid rent plus reversion) while the court would 
permit him to recover $1. This is too little because the promisee's expectation interest sums to $115. 
30. The Comment to ? 2A-504 of the proposed new U.C.C. Article 2A dealing with lease contracts 
describes clauses such as the one used in this case as "common in leasing practice." A similar case to 
Chandler Leasing is Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1976) in which a retail automobile dealer's contract authorized it to retain the downpayment as liquidated 
damages. Such clauses are common in retail contexts. The court struck the clause "because at the time the 
contract was made, . . . any damages which would result from a possible future breach .. . would be easily 
ascertainable." These damages would be the difference between the contract and market or resale prices. 
The dealer, however, apparently was a lost volume seller, whose typical suit would be for profits. These 
are hard to prove. The liquidated damage clause probably represented a reasonable estimate of those profits 
and thus should have been sustained. 
31. The case is Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). 
386 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 369 
ee can recover the price although it saved variable cost by not having to 
produce the goods. Take-or-pay clauses authorize promisees to recover the full 
price on a minimum quantity rather than the contract market differential on the 
larger amount that the parties expect will be shipped because the contract 
market differential can be difficult to prove in court. The formula for creating 
the minimum quantity is chosen so that the specific performance damages under 
the contract equal the contract market differential for the larger amount the 
parties expected to trade. Thus damages under take-or-pay clauses are not 
penal.32 Hence, a judge as expert in economics and as friendly to freedom of 
contract as Judge Posner created a precedent hat, if generalized, would outlaw 
an efficient practice in several industries (take-or-pay clauses are used in natural 
gas, coal, and electricity contracts).33 
These examples suggest that there may be more to fear from judicial 
oversight than from poor party predictions. Thus the branch of the liquidated 
damage rule that authorizes ex ante judicial review should be repealed.34 
The ex post branch of the liquidated damage rule authorizes a court to strike 
a stipulated sum that turns out to be above the promisee's loss. This aspect of 
the rule may seem justifiable because a remedy that is supracompensatory in 
32. For discussion of take-or-pay clauses, see Crocker & Masten, Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term 
Contracts: Take or Pay Provisions for Natural Gas, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 1083 (1985); Masten, Minimum 
Bill Contracts: Theory and Policy, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 85 (1988). 
33. Judge Posner recognized that the contract in this case resembled a take-or-pay clause but believed 
that the take-or-pay clause in such industries as natural gas could be compensatory only because suppliers 
there had a very large ratio of fixed to variable cost; the clause must overcompensate, he held, where the 
promisee incurred "only a fraction of its costs before performance began." This is incorrect: the clause never 
overcompensates on an expected basis. A take-or-pay clause may be ex post inefficient when demand 
collapses; then the efficient trading quantity may be less than the contract minimum. To find the efficient 
trading quantity, a court would have to know the relevant demand and cost curves. The discussion of the 
ex post branch of the liquidated damage rule shows that courts should not attempt to reconstruct such 
economic variables. See text this page. Judge Posner's difficulty probably stemmed from the fact that he 
had made no study of liquidated damage clauses generally and neither party mentioned take-or-pay clauses 
during the case. That courts and lawyers seldom are industry experts is the reason why courts generally 
do not review contract clauses. 
Courts often strike liquidated damage clauses if the promisor can breach in several ways but is required 
to pay the same stipulated sum for any breach. Such clauses are considered penal because they necessarily 
overcompensate when the default is small. This reasoning erroneously assumes that it is costless to specify 
the expected loss for every type of breach that could occur. Creating stipulated sums actually is costly, so 
parties sometimes specify sums that reflect mean or minimum expected losses. Contracts that do this will 
not overcompensate promisees on average. An example of judicial misunderstanding here is Stock Shop, 
Inc. v. Bozell & Jacobs, Inc., 481 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). The plaintiff shipped a large number 
of original color transparencies to defendant for possible use by one of defendant's clients in an advertising 
campaign. Specifying the value of each photograph in a large batch would be expensive so the contract 
recited that defendant "agrees . . . that the reasonable minimum value of . . . [each individual lost] ... 
transparency shall be no less than fifteen hundred ($1,500) dollars." Defendant lost several photographs. 
The court did not dispute plaintiff's claim, in the suit for stipulated damages, that its liquidated damage 
clause was standard in the industry. Nevertheless, the clause was held to be invalid in expectation because 
the "$1,500 per photograph figures may bear no relationship to the actual value of a photograph." 
34. Rea argues that a liquidated damage clause that is penal in expectation probably reflects either 
unconscionability or some form of mistake and so should be stricken. See Rea, supra note 8. This argument 
is unpersuasive for the reasons given in text; that is, courts should apply the unconscionability doctrine if 
there is reason to believe that a procedural defect existed, and, absent such a defect, should not review 
contracts to correct mistakes. 
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the event could induce an inefficient performance. Courts, however, cannot 
easily know when a clause is supracompensatory. Promisees contract for 
stipulated sums when it would be expensive or impossible for them to prove 
their actual loss. In addition, the existence of ex post judicial review sometimes 
forces a promisee to attempt to prove that loss in order to defeat the promisor's 
claim that the stipulated sum is penal in application. Because this is hard to do, 
a promisor's ability to force substantive review encourages promisors to breach 
when performance would be efficient. Since promisees stipulate sums just in 
order to avoid this danger, substantive ex post review reduces the efficacy of 
liquidated damage clauses. And since these clauses are no more likely than 
other contract terms to malfunction, ex post judicial review is no more justifi- 
able here than elsewhere. Therefore, the branch of the liquidated damage rule 
that authorizes this review should be repealed also.35 
B. Specific Performance 
Contracts for specific performance are unenforceable, but courts award 
specific relief when damages are inadequate. The ban on specific performance 
contracts is best justified in the same (unpersuasive) way as the ban on penalty 
clauses. There is an ex ante aspect. The specific performance remedy can 
function in the same way as a penal damage measure; a promisor who fails to 
perform specifically is subject to severe sanctions. Hence, promisees could seek 
specific performance contracts in order later to induce promisors to perform 
35. Section 2A-504(1) of the proposed new U.C.C. Article dealing with leases eliminates ex post 
judicial review of liquidated damage clauses in lease contracts. The Comment does not explain why, but 
good reasons for the reform exist. 
Commentators occasionally claim that liquidated damage clauses create externalities while expectation 
damages do not. See Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author); Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1981). It apparently follows that courts should award the expectation in preference 
to enforcing a liquidated damage clause. This conclusion assumes that courts know what the expectation 
is. In contrast, promisees commonly use liquidated damage clauses when the rules that damages must be 
foreseeable and provable with reasonable certainty would otherwise preclude recovery of the expectation. 
Since compensatory damages are efficient relative to no damages, courts should enforce liquidated damage 
clauses though they may create externalities. Also, the scope of the externality argument is unclear. The 
interesting Chung paper, supra, for example, argues that the promisor and promisee will agree to a penalty 
clause in order to improve the bargaining power of the promisor in an ex post negotiation with a later buyer, 
who is expected to appear in the interval between the time the contract is made and the time when it is to 
be performed. Such penalty clauses sometimes could prevent higher valuing buyers from purchasing, but 
the circumstances under which the argument holds seem limited. 
Professor Daniel Friedmann recently criticized efficient breach theory. See Friedmann, The Efficient 
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989). According to Professor Friedmann, giving the promisee a 
property right in a promised performance is more consistent with our society's general normative views 
than, and would not increase transaction costs relative to, a rule that permitted promisors to breach on the 
payment of compensation. Professor Friedmann does not claim that supracompensatory damages are efficient 
nor does his argument support general judicial review of liquidated damage clauses. He concludes that 
"parties in a contractual setting should be left free to define the ambit of their rights, and it is open to them 
to stipulate that the promisor will be allowed to terminate the contract subject to payment of damages." Id. 
at 23. 
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more frequently than their costs and the promisees' valuations would justify, 
or to require promisors to purchase their freedom by making supracompensatory 
payments. It was shown above that promisees prefer contracts that deny them 
these powers. Consequently, the "ex ante" justification for banning contracts 
for specific relief is incorrect. 
If courts were to enforce these contracts, there remains the question what 
should be done when the contract is silent respecting remedies. Promisees 
generally prefer damages when the market offers good substitutes for the 
promisor's performance. An order for specific relief may take years to get; in 
the meanwhile, the promisee could not carry on his affairs. A promisee would 
rather purchase a substitute promptly and sue later for monetary relief.36 In 
contrast to this general promisee preference, specific performance is optimal 
relative to damages in two important cases. In the first, the expectation measure 
is not monetizable. Hence, the parties could neither rely on courts to award it 
nor create liquidated damage clauses. Specific performance is efficient relative 
to no remedy. In the second case, renegotiation is cheap. Then specific perfor- 
mance can be efficient relative to damages.37 Promisees also may prefer spe- 
cific performance when they anticipate difficulty in collecting money. The 
parties' preferences respecting specific relief thus may be too context-dependent 
to support the creation of any general default. On the other hand, some rule is 
necessary. Perhaps the best solution is to make damages the default, in conse- 
quence of the general promisee preference for substitutional relief, but to 
enforce specific relief clauses.38 
There also is an "ex post" aspect to the ban on specific performance con- 
tracts. A promisee with a contract right to specific performance may later learn 
that the market provides good substitutes but forego these in favor of threaten- 
ing specific performance to exploit the promisor. Restricting specific perfor- 
mance to cases when the legal remedy is inadequate deters this behavior. The 
concern to prevent exploitation cannot justify the ban on specific performance 
contracts for two reasons. First, promisees would not seek these contracts in 
order to exploit. Promisors know when substitutes are conveniently obtainable 
ex post. Hence, a request for a specific performance clause when it likely would 
be unnecessary may excite suspicion (and a high price). Thus exploitation could 
occur only when a promisee who contracted for the right to specific relief later 
discovered that such relief was unnecessary but chose to demand it to extort 
36. This argument was first made in Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 
(1979). 
37. See Rogerson, supra note 10 (when renegotiation is costless, buyer engages in ex post reliance and 
buyer has bargaining power, specific performance remedy induces more optimal reliance than damage 
remedy). 
38. An implication of this solution is repeal of the rule that a promisee/buyer always can get specific 
performance of a promise to sell realty. There seems no evidence that such promisees commonly prefer 
specific relief to damages. To the contrary, agreements to sell real property frequently contain liquidated 
damage clauses. 
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a large payment. This apparently would seldom happen. Second, bad faith 
promisees seldom could make credible extortion threats. As said above, when 
substitutes exist, promisees commonly do better to buy them. Also, the promi- 
sor could purchase a substitute and supply it to satisfy her contractual duty. 
Hence, a promisee who threatens a specific performance suit when a thick 
market exists ex post is unlikely to be believed. 
The argument that promisees would not use the right to obtain specific 
performance to exploit promisors generates two predictions. First, requests for 
specific performance will be as uncommon in jurisdictions where specific 
performance is freely available as they are here. If promisees seek specific 
performance only when substitutes are unavailable, and do not seek to exploit, 
then the incidence of specific performance requests should be invariant to the 
legal regime, so long as market conditions are roughly the same across these 
regimes. This prediction is consistent with impressionistic evidence that specific 
performance is seldom sought in European jurisdictions where the remedy is 
easy to get.39 The second prediction is that promisees who litigate specific 
performance cases to judgment almost always win. American doctrine holds 
that the promisee is entitled to specific performance when the remedy at law 
is inadequate. If promisees seek specific performance when market substitutes 
clearly do not exist, rather than to extort promisors, then promisee plaintiffs 
obviously would lack an adequate legal remedy and so should always prevail. 
This prediction was confirmed by a recent survey of many cases, which found 
that specific relief almost never is denied on the ground that plaintiff had an 
adequate legal remedy.' Promisees have no greater incentive to exploit when 
the remedy is made available by contract than when it is made available by law. 
In sum, specific relief clauses as well as liquidated damage clauses should 
be freely enforceable. Promisees would not seek either type of clause to exploit 
promisors, nor is the danger of ex post exploitation serious. Just as courts apply 
the standard damage rules when the contract does not contain a liquidated 
damage clause, they should apply these rules if the contract is silent respecting 
specific performance. The damage remedy usually is best, but the parties should 
have discretion to substitute other remedies. If courts enforced clauses for 
specific relief while letting damages be the default, the current rules regulating 
the granting of specific relief are unnecessary. Regulation is superfluous when 
contract will do. 
39. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 277 & n.24. 
40. Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L. REV. 688 (1990). Making specific 
performance clauses enforceable probably would expand use of the remedy; parties could define damage 
adequacy for themselves rather than rely on the courts' relatively restricted definition. 
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C. Punitive Damages 
Promisees prefer there not be a punitive damages remedy for the same 
reason that they reject penal contract measures. The likelihood that the promisee 
would sue on either remedy, if it existed, would induce the promisor to perform 
too frequently. Promisors charge extra if they have to perform in loss states. 
These higher prices reduce the promisees' expected gains from trade below the 
gains they would make under the expectation measure. Because both punitive 
damages and penal contract measures have this effect, promisees want neither 
remedy. Thus the traditional rule against awarding punitive damages for 
contract breach should be retained.4" 
Punitive damages also should not be awarded for the tort of inducing breach 
of contract because imposing a penalty on the third party has the same effect 
as imposing the penalty on the promisor. To see how, suppose that a third party 
is considering whether to bid for the promisor's performance. The third party 
would reduce the size of her bid by the value of the sanction that the promisee 
could impose on her. If the promisee could only sue the third party for the 
promisee's expectation, the third party would induce breach whenever she 
valued the promisor's performance more highly than the promisee did. If the 
promisee could sue for punitive damages, the third party would reduce her bid 
by the amount of the penalty. When the penalty is high enough, the third party 
would not attempt to induce breach although her valuation is highest. In these 
cases, the promisor would perform although the (opportunity) cost of perfor- 
mance-the third party's best offer-exceeded the value of performance to the 
promisee. Promisees ex ante prefer not to have damage rules that generate this 
result.42 Hence, only compensatory damages should be awarded for the tort of 
41. An example of the cases that are disapproved here is Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 
Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977). In Hibschman, compensatory damages for breach of a repair and 
replacement warranty on a new car were $1,500. The Indiana Supreme Court held that while the evidence 
would support a verdict that "appellant merely attempted to fulfill its contract and to do no more than that 
contract required," the facts also would support an inference "that Hibschman Pontiac acted tortiously and 
in willful disregard of the rights of Batchelor" by not making repairs and by trying "to convince Batchelor 
that the problems were not with the car, but rather with Batchelor." The jury awarded punitive damages 
of $15,000, ten times actual losses. The supreme court reduced the penal multiplier to five and affirmed. 
In a more recent example, according to the Wall Street Journal, plaintiff sued E.F. Hutton & Co. because 
his broker pursued a more risky trading strategy than plaintiff believed he had authorized. Plaintiff lost 
$27,000 which the jury awarded him; the jury also awarded $800,000 in punitive damages, a penal multiplier 
of almost thirty. See Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1990, ? B, at 7, col. 1. 
42. This analysis rests on the assumption that promisees prefer to profit from performance, not speculate 
on the later appearance of parties with valuations higher than their own. If promisees plan to search ex post 
for other parties who have valuations higher than their own and propose these parties to the promisor, then 
they must be compensated for this activity. Such promisees could contract for "penal" damage measures 
(or prefer a punitive damage award); the increment of damages above the expectation actually would be 
compensation for incurring search costs. See Haddock, McChesney & Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic 
Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1990). This possibility is ruled 
out by the assumption here that promisees want only performance. The possibility also is consistent with 
this Article's argument: Haddock, et al. show that the promisee would contract to get his expectation plus 
a competitive return for the service of finding a higher valuing promise, not that the promisee would prefer 
a supracompensatory remedy when he provided no se-rch services. As an empirical matter, promisees seem 
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inducing breach. The Pennzoil case shows that this reform would have impor- 
tant consequences.43 
This analysis of the punitive damages remedy rests on the assumptions that 
the expectation interest is fully compensatory and that promisees always will 
sue to obtain it. Given these assumptions, punitive damages are inappropriate 
to vindicate the promisee's interest in realizing gains from trade. Both assump- 
tions are questionable, however. Respecting the former, punitive damages 
sometimes are awarded to compensate the promisee for dignitary losses that 
the expectation remedy traditionally excluded." This is a weak rationale for 
punitive damages. The law generally refuses to compensate for emotional harm 
because the damages are difficult to foresee and to prove with reasonable 
certainty. If the unforseeability and uncertainty objections are too weak to bar 
the award of damages for dignitary losses, then these losses should be included 
in the promisee's expectation. If the objections are telling, then compensation 
for dignitary losses cannot be justified by calling the compensation "penal." 
Thus the argument against awarding punitive damages for breach of contract 
is unaffected by the recognition that some losses are intangible. The assumption 
that promisees always sue is more troublesome. Part IV considers this assump- 
tion in detail.45 
III. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 
The analysis in Part I rested on several assumptions. Some of these, such 
as that the parties do not engage in postcontractual reliance, have been dis- 
cussed above. Four assumptions have not been considered. Part III discusses 
three of them. The fourth, that promisees always sue, is analyzed in Part IV. 
to provide these services infrequently. 
43. The Pennzoil case involved a suit for inducing the breach of a merger agreement. The Texas appeals 
court affirmed a judgment against the inducer of $10 billion, of which $3 billion were punitive. See Texaco, 
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). A general criticism of the tort of inducing 
breach of contract is in Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash 
of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 78-89 (1982). For recent defenses of the tort see 
BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877 (1990); Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract 
as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987). The argument in text holds only that 
punitive damages should not be awarded against the tortfeasor. 
44. See Chapman & Trebilcock, Punitive Damages. Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 741 (1989). The Restatement (Second) now provides that damages "for emotional disturbance" should 
be granted when "the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely 
result." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ? 353 (1981). 
45. The analysis here of the normative implications of a promisee preference for compensatory relief 
can be extended to any remedy that may be thought to overcompensate, such as restitution or the cost of 
completion rule. For example, a breaching promisor is permitted to receive restitution damages. RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ? 374(1) (1981). This rule is justifiable because the contrary rule would 
put the promisee in a better position than performance would have done; that is, a legal rule which denied 
restitution would function as a penal damage measure. Since the parties prefer there not to be penalties, 
they would contract for the rule awarding restitution if the law did not supply it. Other extensions of the 
analysis here are omitted for brevity. A general discussion of possibly supracompensatory remedies is in 
Craswell, Contract Remedies and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
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A. Promisees Do Not Prefer Risk 
The analysis assumes that promisees do not prefer risk. A promisee that 
likes risk may want to treat his contract as a lottery ticket that pays his valua- 
tion minus the price upon performance and a multiple of this sum upon breach. 
The price increase that this preference induces is the cost of the lottery ticket. 
There seems not to be evidence that parties treat commercial contracts as lottery 
tickets. Rather, these parties make contracts to obtain the gains from engaging 
in contracting behavior. Hence, the assumption that the parties do not prefer 
risk seems innocuous.46 
B. Promisees Cannot Affect the Odds of Breach 
Part I also assumed that the promisee cannot affect the likelihood that the 
promisor will breach (except through the promisee's choice of a damage 
measure). In the analysis above, the promisor's breach decision is a function 
of her costs, which are assumed to be exogenously determined. Hence, the 
assumption that the promisee cannot affect the breach probability is implied by 
the assumption that costs are exogenous. Suppose instead that a promisee, after 
the contract is made, could increase the promisor's costs such that the promisor 
would prefer breach. Such a promisee may seek a penal damage measure if his 
expected gain from inducing breach exceeded the reduction in his gain from 
the contract's higher price.47 The ex ante branch of the liquidated damage rule 
permits a court to strike a clause that is so motivated. Also, a liquidated sum 
that is compensatory in the expectation may turn out to be supracompensatory 
in the event. A promisee then may attempt to induce breach to collect the 
penalty.48 The ex post branch of the liquidated damage rule eliminates the 
incentive to induce breach because it holds that supracompensatory clauses are 
unenforceable. Thus the conclusions reached above would have to be modified 
if promisees commonly could, and also would, substantially increase a 
promisor's costs after the contract were made. 
The assumption that promisees cannot affect the odds of breach is often 
true. For example, a buyer seldom can affect the failure rate on the seller's 
46. When the parties are risk averse, their preference for contract remedies is influenced by their 
concern for risk sharing. See, e.g., Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983). Liquidated damage clauses are commonly sought by commercial promisees. These 
promisees are not risk averse if they are maximizing profits, because then their utility functions are linear 
in income. The analysis above goes through if promisees are risk neutral or risk averse. 
47. A promisee could profit from this strategy only if the promisor did not anticipate it and raise the 
price to reflect the possibility that breach could be caused by the promisor as well as by exogenous events. 
48. Clarkson, Miller, and Muris argue that this is a serious danger. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, 
Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 351. The text next argues that 
the danger ordinarily is remote. In unusual cases when such strategic behavior is feasible, the parties 
seemingly avoid it by using third-party bonding mechanisms. See Kroeber, An Alternative Mechanism to 
Assure Contractual Reliability, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983). 
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assembly line. When the promisee could affect the odds of performance, the 
question is whether he would bargain for a penalty rule in anticipation of doing 
so; if not, the assumption of promisee powerlessness does not affect the conclu- 
sions reached above. Promisees would not bargain for penalty clauses in the 
hope of later causing contract breaches, nor would promisees often exploit 
promisors when stipulated sums turn out to be penal, because in both situations 
the costs of inducing breach seem higher than the gains. A promisee would 
incur three categories of cost. First, the contract price is higher when the 
damage rule is penal. Second, inducing breach can create reputational losses. 
Third, the promisee could himself be liable for damages. Respecting the third 
cost, inducing breach to collect liquidated damages is a violation of the legally 
implied covenant of good faith. A promisee who is found to have violated this 
covenant cannot collect liquidated damages and also is liable for the promisor's 
lost expectation. 
The gains from successfully inducing breach are unlikely to exceed these 
three categories of cost. The first cost is incurred for sure (because the price 
is higher when the contract's damage measure is higher); the last two costs are 
increasing in the possible gains. To see why this is so, realize that when the 
liquidated damages that the promisee would collect are large, the promisor is 
determined to perform. The promisee would have to make strenuous efforts to 
induce a determined promisor to breach. The more strenuous are these efforts, 
the more likely is it that third parties will recognize that the efforts had been 
made. Attempting to induce breach when the penalty is high thus disadvantages 
the promisee in two ways: it increases the promisee's reputational loss and it 
eases the promisor's task of proving in court that the promisee violated his duty 
of good faith. Therefore, the strategy of attempting to induce breach is least 
likely to pay off when it is most desirable to pursue-when the liquidated 
damages would be large. On the other hand, a promisee would not seek a small 
liquidated damage clause with the object of inducing its breach, nor would he 
engage in ex post strategic behavior just to collect slight damages. Thus the 
assumption that promisees cannot affect the likelihood of breach also is effec- 
tively true. 
C. Both Parties Share the Same Breach Probability Estimate 
This assumption's relevance to the argument should first be explained. The 
promisee wants a damage measure that equals the value he expects performance 
to have. The price that the promisee will pay for such a damage measure is this 
value times the probability he assigns to breach. A mistake in predicting the 
breach probability does not imply a mistake in predicting the value of perfor- 
mance unless these variables are correlated. When they are not, a promisee 
mistaken about probabilities will be willing to pay too much for a compensatory 
damage clause (if he overestimates) or unwilling to pay the correct amount (if 
394 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 369 
he underestimates), but will not buy the wrong sum. Hence, relaxing the 
assumption that promisees know the breach probability can affect the argument 
only when the two variables of breach probability and performance value are 
correlated.49 
The possibility that this correlation exists does not support the case for 
judicial review of liquidated damage clauses for three reasons. First, promisee 
mistakes may generate few penalties. Promisees in the correlated case will not 
seek penalties when they underestimate breach probabilities. Promisees who 
overestimate will seek penalties only sometimes, because overestimates may 
not only cause promisees to overestimate the value that performance will have 
but also may cause promisees to underestimate value. Respecting the former 
possibility, suppose that the likely cause of a breach is a foreign embargo. If 
the embargo occurs but the promisor nevertheless delivers, the product will be 
worth a lot. A promisee who overestimates the likelihood of an embargo thus 
may also overestimate the value that performance would have were an embargo 
to occur. Such a promisee will (inadvertently) contract for a penalty. Respecting 
the latter possibility, let the likely cause of breach be shrinking demand for the 
product (the promisor will get so few orders that she will do better not to 
produce). A promisee who overestimates the likelihood of a fall in demand will 
(inadvertently) purchase an undercompensatory damage measure, because when 
demand falls the product is worth little to him. In sum, overestimates in the 
breach probability will not systematically induce promisees to purchase penalty 
clauses while underestimates in this probability cannot generate penalties. Thus 
promisee mistakes may produce few penalty clauses in the correlated case. 
Second, there is no reason to think that promisee errors are systematically 
high or low. If promisee estimates of the breach probability are unbi- 
ased-partly random but correct on average-judicial intervention could 
improve matters on average only if courts could shrink the error term. This 
would happen if courts acting ex post could create damage measures that are 
materially closer to the measures that the true economic variables imply than 
the parties could create ex ante.50 This is unlikely. As argued in Part II.A, 
judicial review of liquidated damage clauses apparently has not been successful. 
Third, the breach probability and promisee value variables seem 
uncorrelated much of the time. The factors that may induce a producer of ball 
bearings to breach, for example, seem uncorrelated with the value of ball 
bearings to each member of the heterogeneous et of ball bearing buyers. When 
these variables are uncorrelated, promisees will not contract for penalties. And 
49. When the parties' estimates of the breach probability differ, there is an incentive to speculate 
respecting the damage measure. This outcome is ruled out here by the assumption that the parties prefer 
not to speculate with liquidated damage clauses. That assumption seems plausible. Hence, Part Ll.C. omits 
discussion of speculation. 
50. The adverb "materially" is added to the sentence above because litigation is expensive. Thus minor 
improvements in the accuracy of liquidated damage clauses could not justify systematic judicial review. 
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for these three reasons, the likelihood that promisees sometimes mistake the 
breach probability should not affect the argument here.5' 
IV. POSITIVE COLLECTION COSTS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Promisees sometimes do not sue because they are uninformed about their 
rights or because litigation is too expensive. The former difficulty can be 
ameliorated by disclosure.52 The latter difficulty is discussed here. The policy 
issues that "rational apathy" raises have generated a large literature. To make 
sense of the limited aspect of the subject analyzed below, three connected issues 
should be noted. The first concerns the relation between the private and public 
spheres. Sophisticated promisees know that litigation costs are an obstacle to 
enforcing legal rights; their contracts sometimes deal with these costs. The state, 
prima facie, should provide unsophisticated promisees with the protections that 
sophisticated promisees obtain. If these parties reject certain solutions, such as 
penalties and the awarding of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff, should the 
state provide the rejected solutions to ordinary people? 
The second issue concerns whether there are economies of scale to promise 
keeping. When no economies of scale exist, positive collection costs are 
unlikely to cause inefficiency. The promisee will take the cost of enforcing the 
contract into account when he makes it. Regulation may be justified in this case 
only if the state could reduce collection costs more cheaply than private parties 
could.53 In the scale economy case, it is uneconomical for a promisor to keep 
her promise to just one or a few promisees; rather, she will keep her promise 
to a large set of promisees or none. Here positive collection costs can cause 
inefficiency. The threat that a given promisee will sue cannot itself induce the 
promisor to perform; rather, a promisee who sues can only guarantee himself 
compensation. This is because when not every promisee will sue, the promisor 
will breach if the costs of keeping her promise are below the gains to promisees 
as a group but above the costs of compensating the promisees that litigate. 
What kind of regulation would best ameliorate this inefficiency? 
51. Mistakes in the breach probability should not influence a promisee preference for specific 
performance because that preference is largely a function of whether a monetary remedy can be devised, 
not what the probable loss from breach will be. 
52. Federal law and such statutes as the Uniform Consumer Credit Code often require firms to advise 
consumers of their legal rights in credit and sales contracts. 
53. This sentence is put tentatively because the question when the state should encourage or discourage 
litigation in tort contexts is complex. A concise review of the issues is in Rose-Ackerman & Geistfeld, The 
Divergence Between Private and Social Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 
16 J. LEGAL STuD. 483 (1987). Also, the incentive to sue is a function not only of litigation costs but also 
of the variance in expected returns. See Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option Pricing Approach, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990). Thus focusing only on one variable can be misleading. Part IV abstracts from 
these considerations: it asks whether punitive damages is an appropriate legal response when it is known 
(here assumed) that underenforcement of the law in consequence of high litigation costs would generate 
suboptimal promise keeping on the part of firms. A complete treatment of the relation between efficiency 
and incentives to sue would consider the contributions of the scholars cited here (and others). 
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The third issue concerns solutions. There are two ways to induce promisees 
to sue, by reducing their costs or by increasing their gains. Punitive damages 
increase the gains from suit. Should the state solve the "underenforcement 
problem" by reducing promisee costs or by increasing promisee gains? 
This Part argues that sophisticated private parties prefer cost reduction when 
economies of scale exist and when they do not. Hence, the claim that promisees 
would not contract for penalties is unaffected when the assumption that collec- 
tion costs are zero is relaxed. Part IV also argues that the state should prefer 
the cost reduction solution too when it assists unsophisticated promisees or 
responds to underenforcement inefficiencies. This second conclusion does not 
imply that punitive damages never should be awarded for behavior that is 
associated with a breach of contract. The analysis above showed that penal 
measures are inappropriate to vindicate the promisee's interest in realizing gains 
from trade, given that promisees sue to protect their expectation; and it is 
argued below that penal measures are an inappropriate means of inducing suit. 
Promisors sometimes may behave maliciously and despicably enough to justify 
a retributive sanction. This behavior seems rare in connection with the typical 
contract breach, but there is a plausible case for punitive damages when it 
occurs. Analyzing that case is beyond the scope of the analysis here.54 
A. Private Contracts and Collection Costs 
Promisees could reduce collection costs in three ways: (1) contract for a 
penal damage measure out of which collection costs will be recovered; (2) 
require the promisor to pay these costs if the promisor is held liable for breach; 
(3) reduce dispute resolution costs cooperatively. The first response collapses 
into the second in the private context. A promisee does not want a damage 
measure that would award more than the sum of his lost expectation plus legal 
costs (for the reasons given above); and a damage measure that would award 
less will not solve the promisee's problem. Hence, a promisee who wants 
money would not purchase a penal damage measure but rather would bargain 
to receive legal and related costs. 
54. The American Law Institute Project on Product and Process Injuries is likely to reject the punitive 
damages sanction to cure the underenforcement problem, if successful plaintiffs can recover legal fees, but 
retain the sanction to deal with cases of outrageous producer behavior. See ALI, COMPENSATION A D 
LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIEs, FINAL REPORT, PRELIMINARY DRAFT No. 3, vol. 2, ch. 
2 (Oct. 1990). A thoughtful argument for applying punitive sanctions to such conduct is provided by Grady. 
See Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L. REV. 
1197 (1989). There also seems to be a case for punitive damages in thin markets, when a party takes 
another's entitlement to property or bodily integrity. This is because repairing the injured party's loss may 
be insufficient to deter such takings; rather, the taker must be "made whole" too, by being forced back to 
its status quo ante utility level. A punitive sanction sometimes is necessary to achieve this. See Haddock, 
McChesney & Spiegel, supra note 42. This is an interesting argument but seems unrelated to the concerns 
discussed in this part of the article. Part IV considers cases in which the parties operate in thick markets 
and just breach or perform. 
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Commercial parties, however, commonly reject this solution. This probably 
is because each party is the most efficient bearer of the risk that it will incur 
collection or defense costs. The magnitude of these costs is difficult to predict 
at contracting time; hence, the typical contract would have to award a party 
"reasonable" attorneys' fees on breach. This arrangement would cause the 
moral hazard problems associated with any cost plus contract. Counsel would 
have an incentive to devote excessive resources to the prosecution or defense 
of any case it may win because in such cases the party's litigation costs are less 
than the expected final burden; there is a positive probability that legal costs 
can be imposed on the other side. Also, the cost of an attorneys' fee clause is 
hard to calculate ex ante. Thus, each party probably would charge her contract 
partner too much for bearing the moral hazard risk. In addition, a party that 
requests a legal fee clause may be taken to signal that it would rather sue than 
work disputes out privately. This is a bad signal to send. Consistent with these 
analyses, legal fee clauses seldom are observed in commercial contracts al- 
though courts will enforce them.5 
The third response, to reduce collection costs jointly, seems more popular. 
Means to do this include: making contract clauses clear, which reduces the costs 
of litigating whether there was a breach and thus reduces the likelihood of 
breach itself;56 stipulating damages, which eliminates the costs of having to 
prove them; using performance bonds, which have relatively low collection 
costs; using collateral that can be privately repossessed; and incorporating 
arbitration clauses. All of these methods of reducing dispute resolution costs 
are observed in practice. 
When contractors are unsophisticated-consumers or unorganized employ- 
ees-they seldom will contract for these cost-minimizing options. The state can 
help with the same set of responses listed above. If there are no economies of 
scale to promise keeping, the penalty solution collapses into the legal fee 
solution here as well. Unsophisticated promisees also do not want penal damage 
measures that award sums above or below their costs of suit. States sometimes 
do award legal fees to successful plaintiffs,57 and the Magnuson-Moss Act and 
55. Consumer contracts sometimes require the breaching consumer to pay the promisee firm's legal 
fees. The analysis here implies that the legality of these contracts should be rethought. 
56. An interesting example of the effect that clarity has on breach is given by the coal industry, where 
contract indices in the early 1980's generated prices that were too high as measured by current spot market 
prices but buyers seldom breached. A knowledgeable analyst claimed that there was little breach "because 
the terms and conditions of long term coal contracts are typically fairly explicit and the obligations of the 
parties quite clear." Joskow, The Performance of Long Term Contracts: Further Evidence From Coal 
Markets, 21 RAND J. ECON. 251 (1990). 
57. While no state has adopted across-the-board fee-shifting in commercial disputes, a number have 
legislated fee-shifting in specific areas. The major dispute so affected concerns warranties, especially the 
automobile warranty. See ALA. CODE ? 8-20-8 (1984); CAL. CIV. CODE ? 1794(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 
1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ? 42-12-103(3) (1990); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. ? 14-1502(l)(1) (1990); N.Y. 
GEN. Bus. LAW ? 742 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1990). New York also shifts fees to winning plaintiffs 
in consumer credit disputes. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW ? 458(i) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1990). 
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Truth in Lending Law also let winning plaintiffs collect legal fees."8 Legisla- 
tors may believe that the moral hazard risk is lower when individuals are 
plaintiffs. Finally, the state can reduce collection costs by encouraging the 
mediation and arbitration of certain disputes. These solutions also are becoming 
more common.59 
These reforms reduce promisee litigation costs, but the question remains 
whether the state should increase promisee litigation gains instead or as well. 
Before discussing this, it is helpful to analyze the economies of scale case and 
private responses to it. 
B. Private Contracting and Underenforcement 
The promisor, when deciding whether to perform, will compare the cost of 
compliance with the expected cost of a damage judgment.60 When damages 
are undercompensatory or the promisee will sue with probability less than one, 
a promisor may not keep her promise although the cost of compliance is below 
the promisee's loss. Sophisticated promisees respond to the first cause of this 
inefficiency by purchasing compensatory damage measures; they respond to the 
second by the cost reducing methods just discussed. When there are economies 
of scale to promise keeping, these methods cannot ensure that the promisor will 
do as she agreed; they can only ensure that the sophisticated promisee will be 
compensated. 
Economies of scale exist when a promisor must keep her promise to many 
promisees. For example, suppose that the promisor agrees to sell a product with 
a particular quality feature; it is uneconomical to install this feature on just one 
item. Then the promisor, when deciding whether to perform, will compare the 
cost of installing the feature on every item with the expected cost of promisee 
lawsuits. When many promisees will not sue, the costs of compliance may 
exceed the costs of compensating the promisees who litigate. Hence, when 
economies of scale exist, a promisee can assure himself of compensation, but 
cannot assure himself of performance, so long as the applicable damage mea- 
sure provides only for compensation. Would such a promisee contract for a 
penalty? 
58. The American Law Institute Committee on Product and Process Injuries will probably also 
recommend one way fee-shifting for injured individuals. ALI, COMPENSATION ANDLIABILITY FOR PRODUCT 
AND PROCESS INJURIES, FINAL REPORT, supra note 54, at chap. 23. 
59. Twenty states have adopted the Magnuson-Moss approach in connection with warranties of motor 
and farm vehicles. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-?h, para. 1204 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1990). The 
Magnuson-Moss Act specifies that if a manufacturer adopts a dispute resolution procedure complying with 
FTC guidelines, then a consumer with a warranty dispute cannot go to court until she has exhausted the 
arbitration procedure. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act ?110, 15 U.S.C. ?23 10(a)(3) (1988). 
The FTC guidelines require that the arbitration panel be well funded and independent of the manufacturer, 
that it charge no fee, and that it keep written records. 16 C.F.R. ?? 703.1-8 (1990). 
60. For convenience, the text assumes that breach creates no reputational osses. 
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To understand how a private penal sanction would work, suppose that there 
are n promisees each of whom is injured with probability q and suffers the loss 
v." Then the expected total loss that all of the promisees would suffer from 
breach is the sum of the probability of harm times each promisee's lost value, 
n 
or ) qv. Let the promisor's cost of complying with a promise to produce a 
certain quality level be z per unit, and assume that this cost is less than the cost 
of breach (l z < l qv). The promisor thus should comply with her contracts. 
Promisees sue upon breach with probability I` where 0 < I < 1. The promisor's 
true expected cost of breach then is E J`qv, and she will comply when E z < 
E J`qv. Let F be low enough so that the promisor would rather breach and pay 
damages of v to any promisee who sues than keep her promise. She could be 
made to comply if each promisee bargained for a damage measure that would 
pay him his lost value divided by the portion of promisees who will sue, or v/F. 
Then the promisor's expected cost from breach would exceed the cost of 
n n n 
compliance (E Tq * v/F = E qv > E z) and she will keep her promise.62 Be- 
cause the portion of promisees who sue now is assumed to be less than one, 
the damage measure v/F' exceeds the promisee's lost value v. 
Promisees would not contract for this penal damage measure for two 
reasons. First, a promisee who buys a contract with a penal sanction is provid- 
ing a public good, because the promisee pays the higher price associated with 
the sanction but would make no gain. As said above, a promisee could assure 
himself of full compensation by securing a compensatory damage measure and 
a reduction in his costs of collection. Even if promisees particularly want 
performance, each of them may reason that if he buys the compensatory 
measure v at a lower price than the promisor would charge for supplying the 
penal measure v/F, enough other promisees will purchase the penal measure 
to induce the promisor to supply the promised quality. If so, the promisee who 
buys only the damage measure v gets quality partly for free. Because each 
promisee has an incentive to freeload in this way, the penal damage measure 
likely will not be seen. 
The second reason why promisees probably would not purchase penal 
sanctions is that agreements with them are not equilibrium contracts. This is 
because F, the probability with which promisees sue, is endogenous; it is partly 
a function of the damage measure itself. To see why this creates a problem, 
assume that each promisee knows F and let pP be the price if the contract's 
damage measure D generates a payment of v/r and pc be the price if D = v; 
pP>pc because the price increases when the promisor's expected damage pay- 
61. Here v is the value that the promisee attaches to performance, just as in the analysis of Part I. 
62. Commentators have observed that the underenforcement problem can be cured by "grossing up" 
compensatory damages-i.e., dividing the promisee's actual loss by the probability of suit. See, e.g., R. 
COOTER AND T. ULEN, supra note 20, at 391-96; Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 44, at 818-19; R. 
Cooter, Punitive Damages For Deterrence: When and How Much? (University of California School of Law 
at Berkeley Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 89-4, 1989). 
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ment increases. Promisors will comply with promises when the proportion of 
active promisees-those that sue-is high enough. The idea of a compliance 
threshold can be captured by letting F* be the proportion of active promisees 
that is high enough to induce the promisor to comply; the promisor performs 
when 1 ? F* and breaches when F < F*. 
The optimal strategy for a promisee who wants performance apparently is 
to purchase the damage measure D = v/IT if F < P* at price pP; and to purchase 
the damage measure D = v if F ? F* at price pc. In the former case, an insuffi- 
cient number of promisees sue to induce compliance so the promisor will 
breach unless she faces the penal sanction v/I; thus our illustrative promisee 
should be willing to buy this more expensive sanction. In the latter case, 
enough active promisees exist so the promisor can be induced to comply with 
her promise if the illustrative promisee only buys the contractual damage 
measure D = v; thus the promisee should be willing to buy only this less 
expensive measure. 
This promisee strategy would not be pursued in equilibrium. To see why, 
first consider the case when an insufficient number of promisees sue (F < F*). 
Then the strategy requires a promisee to purchase the expensive penal damage 
measure D = v/F. The proportion of promisees that sues is partly a function 
of the damage measure itself; more promisees will sue when they can collect 
v/IT than when they can collect only v. Suppose next that enough promisees 
obtain the penal measure D = v/IT to cause the proportion of promisees that sue 
to rise above r*. Then the posited strategy requires a promisee to shift to the 
less expensive damage measure D = v. But if promisees do this, the proportion 
of promisees that sues may again fall below r*; in that event, promisees must 
return to the penal measure D = v/F. This process has no natural stopping 
point-that is, it is not an equilibrium. The posited promisee strategy thus 
probably would be too difficult to use in practice. Promisees could not condi- 
tion their contract choices on the proportion of litigating promisees-r-as the 
strategy requires, because F would be cycling up and down in consequence of 
the actions that promisees would be taking in accordance with the strategy. 
This cycling problem is curable in theory if the parties play mixed strate- 
gies. To do this would require promisees to obtain the damage measure D = 
v/IT in a certain percent of their deals-say a percent-and the damage measure 
D = v in (1 - x) percent of their deals (O < a < 1); and it would require pro- 
misors to comply with their promises a certain percent of the time-say 0 per- 
cent-and to breach them (1 - 0) percent of the time. Then an equilibrium 
exists in which the promisees would have no reason to vary the proportion of 
the cases in which they pick one or the other damage measure, given the 
noncompliance probability that the promisors choose; and the promisors would 
have no reason to vary this probability given the promisees' actions. In this 
equilibrium, promisees sometimes would bargain for penal clauses and promi- 
sors sometimes would keep their promises. 
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This possibility seems more interesting theoretically than practically. Parties 
seldom are observed to use mixed strategies in life, apparently because it seems 
irrational to people to shift arbitrarily between courses of action-i.e., to buy 
one damage rule and then for no apparent reason to switch and buy the other. 
Also, mixed strategies are complex to devise and play.63 If the possibility of 
a mixed strategy equilibrium is rejected, the difficulty of contracting for a penal 
damage measure remains.' 
In sum, two reasons suggest that sophisticated promisees would not contract 
for a penal damage measure of the form v/IT in the economies of scale case. 
First, to purchase the penal measure is to provide a public good. Second, the 
strategy of conditioning the magnitude of the damage measure on the current 
proportion of promisees that litigate would not be pursued in any plausible 
equilibrium. Because blatantly penal clauses are unenforceable, this argument 
cannot be tested by observing actual contracts; the law rather than the reasons 
discussed here may account for the lack of penal contract responses to the 
promisees' compliance concern. Nevertheless, the reasons seem plausible. They 
suggest that were penal clauses lawful, promisees still would not bargain for 
penal damage measures. Rather, promisees would respond to the 
underenforcement concern in the economies of scale case as they do in the 
usual case. An external benefit of the cooperative methods described above to 
reduce dispute resolution costs is that these methods increase the probability 
of contract enforcement generally and thus ameliorate the underenforcement 
concern. 
C. The Public Response to Underenforcement 
When there are no economies of scale to promise keeping, there is no first 
order efficiency case for intervention. Promisees commonly sue when the costs 
of suit are less than the gains, and pay less for performances when the utility 
63. Both criticisms are made in A. Rubenstein, Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory 
(London School of Economics Discussion Paper No. TE/88/181, 1988), who adds "that the use of mixed 
strategies is particularly problematic in any situation where the execution of mixed strategies is costly in 
terms of devoting attention or time." Id at 10. When there is a cost, "a player strictly prefers to use any 
of the pure strategies which appear in the support of the mixed strategy." Id. A pure strategy equilibrium 
is possible in the circumstances above if there is exogenous heterogeneity among the promisees. Should 
some promisees never sue regardless of the size of the legal damages, then 17 may be fixed over relevant 
ranges of the parameters and the other promisees could condition on it. There seems no reason to suppose 
that a nontrivial portion of promisees is unaffected by the damage measure. The analysis in the text assumes 
that the promisor supplies performance in "lumpy" units-she makes all products more durable or 
none-rather than in continuous increments. The assumption is made for convenience and because it often 
is true. The conclusion that a pure strategy penal equilibrium does not exist also holds if continuous cost 
curves are assumed. 
64. The observation that the enforcement probability is endogenous-more people sue when penalties 
increase-has led some commentators to question whether antitrust damages should be trebled. See 
Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1985); Hovenkamp, Treble Damages 
Reform, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1988). 
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calculus would go the other way.65 The state apparently should intervene in 
this case only when it can reduce litigation costs more cheaply than the parties 
could. In the consumer case, this comparative advantage sometimes exists. 
When there are economies of scale, there is an efficiency case for regulation; 
promisors may fail to keep promises even when the aggregate gains from 
promise keeping exceed the costs. The state also could respond to this case by 
reducing promisee litigation costs. Should it instead (or in addition) permit 
promisees who sue to recover the penal sanction v/I? Two considerations 
suggest that punitive damages should not be used. 
First, a public decisionmaker seldom would know the enforcement er- 
ror-the proportion of promisees who will not sue-especially as this propor- 
tion is partly context dependent.66 Second, the equilibrium problem exists here 
too. The parties' ability to respond to penal damage rules by altering purchase 
contracts makes questionable the strategy of using these rules to increase the 
suit probability.67 
To see why, suppose that the state requires contracts to contain the penal 
damage measure v/r and F is caused to rise above 1*. Then promisees would 
prefer a different damage measure but the promisors are prohibited from 
supplying it. The parties thus will be induced to contract out indirectly. 
Promisors will supply contracts that differ from the "old contract," but that 
65. This assumes that promisees know their legal rights or that the state has responded to imperfect 
information by requiring disclosure. Awarding punitive damages apparently could not cure underenforcement 
resulting from ignorance of legal rights; promisees would be uninformed about their right to recover punitive 
damages. 
66. Cooter suggests that courts sometimes could infer the degree of underenforcement by comparing 
the ratio of the marginal decisionmaker's precaution costs to the social harm that breach could cause. See 
R. Cooter, supra note 62, at 9-10. For example, if the costs of precaution are $100 and the harm that 
precaution would avoid is $200, the ratio of the two is ?h. A firm would be on the margin between taking 
precautions and not only if its expected liability for not doing so equalled the precaution cost. In the 
example, given that the harm from noncompliance is $200 the expected liability could equal the $100 
precaution cost only if the enforcement error (r in the text above) is 50%. This is the same value as the 
ratio between precaution costs and breach costs. Thus the enforcement error can be inferred from this ratio. 
Cooter's method for finding the enforcement error is imaginative, but may not help in real cases. The 
method requires a jury to recover ex post what would have been a correct ex ante promisor estimate of 
expected harm (including nonpecuniary harm) as well as the promisor's precaution costs at the margin. Juries 
seldom could find these facts accurately enough to enable the enforcement error to be inferred with sufficient 
confidence. 
67. An interesting analysis of positive litigation costs when parties do not bargain is in Polinsky & 
Rubenfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 
(1988). Some commentators uggest that punitive damages are an appropriate contract law sanction because 
breaches can go undetected. See Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages 
for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980): Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in 
Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
1565 (1985). Undetected breaches also create an underenforcement concern. This possibility is not discussed 
here. Undetected breaches could exist in product or service markets only in connection with what in the 
economics of information are called credence goods. Something is a credence good if the purchaser would 
have difficulty knowing whether he needs it or not or. if he knows that he needs it, whether it was 
appropriately supplied. Examples include a subset of automobile repairs and medical operations. Though 
undetected breaches in connection with credence goods are a concern, responding to them with penal 
sanctions encounters the problems discussed here. For example. a public decisionmaker is unlikely to know 
the percentage of undetected breaches, and so could not use a penal sanction of the form v/r. 
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promisees prefer only because the state has amended the old contract by adding 
a compulsory penal damage measure. When rI> J7*, however, the promisees 
would prefer the old contract with D = v. As a concrete example, under strict 
products liability promisors may respond to a compulsory penal damage 
measure by making safer products than promisees want, because the promisor 
is liable to all victims and they can collect supracompensatory damages. A 
contract that is identical to the old contract and that generates excess safety 
would not exist in equilibrium. The parties would prefer a contract that supplies 
less product variety or a larger downpayment, etc., to restore them to the utility 
level they would have been on had the punitive measure not been imposed. 
Solving the underenforcement problem by requiring a penal measure of the 
form v/I will produce an overenforcement problem that itself leads to contract- 
ing inefficiencies. The question is whether a better strategy exists than requiring 
promisors always to supply the penal damage measure D = v/F. 
The state could use another type of penal measure. Three exist. Under each 
of them the jury is asked whether punitive damages should be awarded given 
the applicable legal standard. If the answer is yes, then (1) the jury has discre- 
tion over the sum; or (2) the jury must award damages of kv, where k > 1 and 
is set by statute (i.e., damages are some multiple of actual losses);68 or (3) the 
jury has discretion to award punitive damages up to a statutorily specified 
sum.69 These penal measures do not respond to the underenforcement concern 
that purportedly justifies the resort to punitive damages, because none of them 
make the size of the sanction a function of the extent of underenforcement. In 
addition, the first penal measure creates considerable uncertainty for promisors. 
Thus it seems better all in all to respond to the likelihood that some promisees 
will not sue by reducing the costs of suit rather than by increasing the gains.70 
V. TWO APPLICATIONS 
A. The Insurance Cases 
Courts sometimes award punitive damages when individual insureds are 
denied benefits. In some of these cases, the insurance company promisor denied 
benefits because it made a mistake. In other cases, the company apparently 
acted under a plan. Courts reject punitive damages when they believe that the 
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ? 1794 (West 1985) (punitive damages in warranty disputes limited to 
twice compensatory damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ? 52-240b (West Supp. 1989) (punitive damages 
limited to twice compensatory damages). The ALI Committee on Product and Process Injuries probably 
will recommend the specified multiplier solution for cases in which it believes punitive damages are 
appropriate. 
69. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. ? 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1990) (punitive damages limited to $350,000). 
70. In addition to these considerations, any damage multiplier should be low when there is a probability 
of legal error. See Calfee & Craswell, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
279, 292-95 (1986). 
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company made an honest mistake' but authorize them when the company 
behaved badly. The courts may be granting punitive damages too frequently. 
Courts award punitive damages for three reasons: to vindicate the 
promisee's interest in making gains from trade; to induce promisees to sue; and 
to punish despicable promisor behavior. The first two reasons cannot justify 
the award of punitive damages. In some of the insurance cases, the promisor's 
behavior seems to have reflected the incompetence of low level employees 
rather than actual malice. Because incompetence is regrettable but not despica- 
ble, punitive damages perhaps are awarded too frequently in the insurance 
context. 
B. The Employment Cases 
Wrongful dismissal cases come in three kinds. First, the dismissal is without 
good cause; a foreman takes an unjustified dislike to an employee. In this case, 
if the dismissal is a breach of contract, the employee loses the expectation of 
receiving future wages. Punitive damages should not be awarded in addition 
to this expectation; the ability to claim them would reduce the value of the 
employment contract just as it reduces the value of other contracts. In the 
second case, the dismissal violates a public policy. For example, the employee 
was discharged for cooperating with a public agency investigating the company 
or its customer.73 The question whether punitive damages should be awarded 
in this case is complex. On the one hand, awarding them encourages employees 
to help enforce the law. On the other hand, since the expected cost of punitive 
judgments is reflected in wages, employees as a group are drafted in the service 
of the state. The appropriate resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
In the third case, the employee is dismissed under humiliating circumstanc- 
es, causing her to incur a noncommercial loss.74 Punitive damages would be 
inappropriate here because there are no economies of scale to good firm 
behavior. The promisor's ability to discharge a particular promisee employee 
with dignity is independent of its ability to discharge any other employee with 
71. E.g., Garule v. Illinois Mut. Life and Casualty Co., 152 Ariz. 600, 734 P.2d 85 (1987); California 
Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1, 56, 221 Cal. Rptr. 171, 201 (1985). 
72. Courts affirm large punitive damage awards in these cases apparently because they believe that 
legal fees deter insureds from suing on moderate claims, and that the companies, in consequence, are too 
reluctant to pay these claims. The punitive sanction is thought to encourage the companies to pay. The 
companies' reluctance to comply with their contracts is unfortunate (if it exists), but awarding legal fees 
is a better solution for the reasons given. 
73. E.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 111. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (where 
employee was discharged in retaliation for supplying information to local law enforcement officials, action 
is in tort and punitive damages are appropriate). 
74. E.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Harless v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 169 W. Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982). 
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dignity. This third case may involve unsophisticated promisees, however. Thus 
here the state may wish to reduce collection costs for individual employees.75 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contract Law had been consistent in its treatment of liquidated damage 
clauses, punitive damages, and specific performance. The courts refused to 
enforce contractually specified sums that appeared to be penalties; refused to 
permit disappointed promisees to recover penal damages; and refused to enforce 
contract clauses that required specific performance. Recently, this consistency 
has been breaking down; the liquidated damage and specific performance rules 
are unchanged, but there has been greater leniency in granting punitive damages 
to certain classes of promisees, such as insureds whose claims were wrongfully 
denied. This Article urges courts to be consistent on a deeper level. It shows 
that promisees do not want contracts that would award them greater compensa- 
tion than the expectation provides. Thus courts should enforce all liquidated 
damage and specific performance clauses; there is no persuasive justification 
for the current practice of treating these contract terms specially. Promisees that 
reject contractual penalties also prefer not to receive punitive damages for 
contract breach; the rules authorizing penal awards are just implied terms in 
the promisees' contracts. Consequently, punitive damages should not be granted 
to vindicate a promisee's interest in making gains from trade. 
The analysis that generates these conclusions rests on several assumptions, 
of which the most controversial is that promisees always sue to protect their 
expectation. Because promisees do not always sue, there is a case for legal 
intervention. The state can increase the frequency of suit by reducing litigation 
costs or by increasing litigation gains. The latter is done by awarding punitive 
damages to disappointed promisees. Private parties prefer the cost reduction 
solution and so, it is argued, should the state. Hence, punitive damages should 
not be awarded to encourage parties to vindicate their contractual rights. There 
remains a retributive case for punitive damages when promisors behave in a 
despicable fashion. Such behavior constitutes a tort and so is beyond the scope 
of the analysis here. 
This Article's argument rests on the premise that because the rules criticized 
here presuppose a promisee preference for supracompensatory remedies, 
showing that that presupposition is mistaken is a sufficient justification for 
reform. The rules, however, seem also to be the product of a "court centered- 
75. For example, California requires the losing defendant in a dispute involving the nonpayment of 
wages or benefits to pay the plaintiff's legal fees. CAL. LABOR CODE ? 218.5 (West 1985). Punitive damages 
are granted in medical malpractice cases, where patient and doctor are in a contractual relationship. The 
analysis above applies to these cases, except that the retributive justification for a punitive sanction may 
exist more frequently in the malpractice context because the defendant is an individual person. See Nelson 
v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623 (1951) (punitive damages awarded against doctor who injected patient with 
illegal substance after having been previously arrested for prescribing the substance). 
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ness" that is at Contract Law's core. Court centeredness, loosely defined, holds 
that courts should ensure that performance under a fair reading of a contract's 
terms would not contradict the parties' "deeper" intentions and fairness. 
Court centeredness produced the famous and still influential opinion in 
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent.76 As is well known, the contract there required 
plaintiff contractor to install "Reading" pipe in the defendant's home, but the 
contractor installed a substantial amount of "Cohoes" pipe. The market value 
of defendant's home seemed trivially affected by the substitution, but 
defendant's architect refused to certify that the work was completed properly. 
The defendant then refused to make the final payment. Judge Cardozo relied 
on "considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention" to hold 
that when the value diminution was small and the remedial cost large, the home 
owner was limited to the value diminution. This result seemed precluded by 
the contract, which explicitly dealt with remedies. It recited that work "which 
is defective or which is not fully in accordance with . . . the specifications, in 
every respect, will be rejected and is to be immediately torn down, removed . . . 
or replaced in accordance with the ... specifications, whenever discov- 
ered . . . ." However, "The owner shall have the option at all times to allow 
the defective or improper work to stand and to receive from the Contractor a 
sum of money equivalent to the difference in value of the work as performed 
and as herein specified."77 The contract thus gave defendant the power to 
choose between the cost of completion and diminution in value damage mea- 
sures, but the court reserved this power for itself. 
A similar reluctance to yield control over remedies is reflected in the rules 
criticized here. Liquidated damages law permits sophisticated commercial 
parties to agree only to those monetary damage measures that courts will find 
"reasonable." Specific performance law reserves to courts the power to decide 
when specific or substitutional relief is appropriate. The recent expansion of 
punitive damage awards reflects court centeredness of a different kind. The 
underenforcement of substantive rules can be ameliorated by reducing the 
parties' litigation costs or increasing the litigation gains for disappointed 
promisees. The parties and the legislatures can best reduce litigation costs. 
Courts can increase the gains, and have actively done so. Court centeredness 
in Contract Law extends beyond remedial issues. An example is the courts' 
tendency to restrict party efforts to contract out of statutory rules that were 
explicitly meant to be defaults.78 
Court centeredness as well as a mistaken view of the economics of contract 
thus seems to explain the existence of the rules analyzed above. This Article 
argues that a better understanding of the economics shows that the commitment 
76. 230 N.Y 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). 
77. The quoted clause is set out in R. Scorr & D. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 78 (1988). 
78. This tendency is analyzed in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 261 (1985). 
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to court centeredness as applied to contract remedies is misplaced. Another way 
to put this conclusion is that the parties will choose appropriate remedies when 
left to their own devices. Similar arguments have been made respecting other 
aspects of contract. The question now, it seems, is whether defenders of court 
centeredness can show how their commitment o it is reconcilable with Contract 
Law's parallel commitment to party autonomy. Absent this showing, one of 
these foundational commitments must be abandoned. 
